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Thermodynamic depth is an appealing but flawed struc-
tural complexity measure. It depends on a set of macroscopic
states for a system, but neither its original introduction by
Lloyd and Pagels nor any follow-up work has considered how
to select these states. Depth, therefore, is at root arbitrary.
Computational mechanics, an alternative approach to struc-
tural complexity, provides a definition for a system’s minimal,
necessary causal states and a procedure for finding them. We
show that the rate of increase in thermodynamic depth, or
dive, is the system’s reverse-time Shannon entropy rate, and
so depth only measures degrees of macroscopic randomness,
not structure. To fix this we redefine the depth in terms of
the causal state representation—ǫ-machines—and show that
this representation gives the minimum dive consistent with
accurate prediction. Thus, ǫ-machines are optimally shallow.
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I. NATURAL COMPLEXITY
Dissipative dynamics, symmetry breaking, phase tran-
sitions, bifurcations, and pattern formation, acting over
different temporal and spatial scales, at different levels
and on different substrates, are presumably responsible
for assembling and freezing in the wide diversity of struc-
tures observed in the natural world. Each of these pro-
cesses has its more-or-less well-developed foundations.
But where are the principles that define and describe
their products? What is structure itself? Does each and
every particular combination of forces lead to a different
and unique class of natural structure, requiring its own
vocabulary and theory? And, how do we detect that
some new structure has emerged in the first place?
These and related questions about nature’s complex-
ity have engaged a large number of researchers for sev-
eral decades now; for a sampling see e.g. Refs. [1–5] and
references therein. One focus has been on quantitative
measures of the complexity of natural objects and of the
processes that bring them into existence—measures that
capture properties more interesting than mere random-
ness and disorder. Existing theory, such as is found in
statistical mechanics, provides relatively well-understood
measures of disorder in (say) temperature and thermo-
dynamic entropy, and of the flow of energy that can do
work in the various free energies. While many applica-
tions and problems remain, there is little pressing need
for new conceptual approaches to randomness and en-
ergy transduction. However, when it comes to structure
something is missing—something else must be invented
and then added to physical theory to account for, work
with, and quantify kinds of structure.
One class of approaches to natural complexity is based
on the theory of sequential discrete computation [6,7]—
the theory of how sundry sorts of discrete-state de-
vices process information at varying levels of sophisti-
cation. The resulting measures of complexity ultimately
express structural properties in terms of universal Turing
machines. Unfortunately, almost all interesting math-
ematical and quantitative questions about these mea-
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sures of structure inherit the uncomputability associated
with those all-powerful machines. More fundamentally,
though, the idea that everything in the world is really
a discrete-state computer strikes one as inadequate; at
a minimum nature is parallel, continuous, spatially ex-
tended, noisy, and quantum mechanical.
Fortunately, in the thermodynamic depth of Lloyd and
Pagels [8] we have a proposal for a noncomputation-
theoretic, empirically calculable measure of the complex-
ity of processes. One central motivation for defining the
thermodynamic depth is that it is small both for regu-
lar and for random processes. Thus, one of its appealing
features is that depth measures something other than
randomness—a property already well-captured by both
Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity [9–11] and Shannon en-
tropy rate [12–15].
In this brief note we introduce the required background
for thermodynamic depth [8] and for an alternative ap-
proach to natural complexity, called computational me-
chanics [16,17], that extends statistical mechanics to ad-
dress issues of structure in a direct way. We review the
definition of thermodynamic depth and apply it to several
simple Markov processes, revealing several ambiguities.
To remove them we redefine the depth in terms of a rep-
resentation based on causal states, those states through
which computational mechanics views the minimal struc-
ture of a system [16,17]. We then prove our main results
on the predictive optimality and minimality of the causal
state representation. Finally, we draw a number of con-
clusions about using thermodynamic depth as a measure
of structural complexity in natural processes.
II. PROCESSES
Following Lloyd and Pagels we focus on discrete-time
processes and consider a given process as a joint proba-
bility distribution Pr(. . . , X−1, X0, X1, . . .) over random
(“microscopic”) variables Xt at each time t that take
values xt in a continuous state space X . In accord with
experimental constraints, we assume that the process is
not observed directly, but states are in fact measured
via a finite-precision instrument. The result is that our
description of the process is in all practicality a joint
distribution over a chain
↔
S ≡ . . . S−2S−1S0S1 . . . of
discrete-valued random variables St that range over a fi-
nite set A of observed states. (Although our notation
differs, this setup follows the account in Ref. [8, p. 194]
of “macroscopic”, “measured”, or “coarse-grained” states
as partitions of the underlying microscopic state space.)
We divide the chain into two semi-infinite halves by
choosing a time t as the dividing point. Denote the past
by
←
St≡ . . . St−3St−2St−1 (1)
and the future by
→
St≡ StSt+1St+2St+3 . . . . (2)
We will assume that the observed process is described
by a temporal shift-invariant measure µ on bi-infinite re-
alizations · · · s−2s−1s0s1s2 · · · , st ∈ A. The measure µ
induces a family of distributions. Let Pr(st) denote the
probability that at time t the random variable St takes
on the particular value st ∈ A and Pr(st+1, . . . , st+L)
the joint probability over sequences of L consecutive
measurements. Consistent with Ref. [8] we assume
time-translation symmetry1 and so Pr(st+1, . . . , st+L) =
Pr(s1, . . . , sL). We denote a sequence of L consecutive
measurements by SL ≡ S1 . . . SL; when looking to the
future (past) the sequence is denoted
→
S
L
(
←
S
L
). (In drop-
ping the time index from Eqs. (1) and (2) we implicitly
take t = 0.) We shall follow the convention that a capital
letter refers to a random variable, while a lower case let-
ter denotes a particular value of that variable. Hence, sL
will denote a particular measurement sequence of length
L.
III. ENTROPY AND RANDOMNESS
The average uncertainty of an L-sequence SL is given
by the Shannon entropy of the joint distribution Pr(SL)
[14]:
H [SL] ≡ −
∑
sL∈AL
Pr(sL) log2 Pr(s
L) . (3)
Looking forward in time the rate of increase of this un-
certainty is defined by the entropy rate
→
hµ ≡ lim
L→∞
H [
→
S
L
]
L
, (4)
where µ denotes the above-mentioned measure. The
quantity
→
hµ measures the irreducible randomness in the
generation of future behavior: the randomness that re-
mains after the correlations over longer and longer fu-
tures are taken into account. The reverse-time entropy
rate
←
hµ is defined similarly in terms of
←
S
L
and measures
historical randomness. Both can be expressed in terms of
a conditional entropy: given knowledge of the measure-
ment history, the uncertainty in the next measurement
S0 is
→
hµ = H [S0|
←
S ] ; (5)
1For the dissipative, Hamiltonian, and quantum systems
considered Ref. [8, pp. 194–5] assumes, moreover, that the
probabilities over the microscopic states are uniform with re-
spect to Lebesgue measure and that the probabilities of se-
quences over the coarse-grained state space are time invariant.
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and similarly, given the future, we have
←
hµ = H [S−1|
→
S ] , (6)
where the entropy of a random variable X conditioned
on the value of another random variable Y is defined as
H [X |Y ] ≡ H [X,Y ]−H [Y ].
IV. THERMODYNAMIC DEPTH
Lloyd and Pagels propose that the complexity of a
macroscopic state s ∈ A is determined by the history that
led to s. The motivation for this is that “complexity must
be a function of the process—the assembly routine—that
brought the object into existence”, [emphasis theirs] [8,
p. 187]; in particular, it is a “measure of how hard it is to
put something together” [8, p. 189]. Starting from a dis-
tribution over macroscopic state sequences, one first finds
the probability of length-L histories that end in state s:
Pr(S−L+1, . . . , S−1, S0 = s|s) (7)
≡
Pr(S−L+1, . . . , S−1, S0 = s)
Pr(s)
. (8)
Then the thermodynamic L-depth DL(s) of state s is
defined by the conditional entropy
DL(s) ≡ H [S−L+1, . . . , S−1, S0 = s|s] . (9)
(From here on we ignore the distinction in Ref. [8] be-
tween “depth” and “thermodynamic depth” by, in effect,
setting Boltzmann’s constant to 1/ ln 2.) Averaging over
all such states gives one the L-depth DL of the system as
a whole:
DL ≡
∑
s∈A
Pr(s)DL(s) , (10)
or,
DL = H [S−L+1, . . . , S−1|S0] , (11)
where we have used the identity H [X,Y |X ] = H [Y |X ].
We define D0 = 0.
The back-stage intuition motivating thermodynamic
depth is the following: if there is little uncertainty about
how to attain a macroscopic state and if trajectories are
confined within narrow bounds, then the macroscopic
state is easy to assemble. In this case the process leading
to that state and generating those trajectories is simple
and the state is shallow. If the historical uncertainty
is large and if a wide range of historical alternatives
has been excluded, then the process is complex and the
macroscopic state is deep. “The thermodynamic depth
of a state b is proportional to the amount of information
[in bits] needed to identify the trajectory that leads to b
given the information that the system is in b” [8, p. 196].
Like all statistical complexity measures, thermody-
namic depth has forsworn awarding high complexities to
mere randomness. Ref. [8] states that it vanishes for com-
pletely random processes, as well as for totally ordered
ones [8, pp. 187, 190–191]. For systems satisfying the mi-
crocanonical assumption of statistical mechanics, Lloyd
and Pagels [8, pp. 190, 194–5] provide another expression
for the depth, as the difference between a coarse-grained
and a fine-grained thermodynamic entropy. Using this
alternate expression, they argue that black holes [8, p.
191], gases at thermal equilibrium [8, p. 191] and salt
crystals [8, p. 191] are shallow and the self-assembly of
protein complexes [8, p. 196] is deep. While it is some-
times easier to evaluate the alternate expression than Eq.
(11), it is strictly equivalent to the latter in the cases
where the necessary (restrictive) conditions behind the
former hold, so we shall confine ourselves to Eq. (11) in
what follows.
The total depth, limL→∞DL, of a process might as well
be bottomless. Like L-depth, it depends on a baseline.
That is, it depends on the time when we judge the process
to have started and on the depth accumulated from the
beginning of time until then. At best, these choices can
be a bit tricky to figure. Of greater physical significance,
therefore, is the asymptotic rate v at which the depth
increases, which we call dive:
v ≡ lim
L→∞
[DL −DL−1] . (12)
The benefit of looking at a rate, which is not considered
in Ref. [8], is that v is independent of the origin of time
and so allows one to more fairly compare processes by
their rate of depth generation.
We now show that v is the reverse-time entropy rate.
Recalling the definition of conditional entropy,H [Y |X ] =
H [X,Y ]−H [X ], Eq. (12) becomes
v = lim
L→∞
[
H [S−L+1, . . . , S0]−H [S0]
−H [S−L+2, . . . , S0] +H [S0]
]
(13)
= lim
L→∞
[
H [S−L+1, . . . , S0]−H [S−L+2, . . . , S0]
]
(14)
= lim
L→∞
H [S−L+1|S−L+2, . . . , S0] (15)
= H [S−L+1|
→
S−L+2] = H [S−1|
→
S ] (16)
=
←
hµ , (17)
where the next-to-last step follows from time-translation
invariance.
For later use note that, since H [Y ] ≥ H [Y |X ], it fol-
lows from Eq. (16) and from translation invariance that
v ≤ H [S0] . (18)
For stationary or asymptotically stationary processes,
we have H [S−L+2, . . . , S0] = H [S−L+1, . . . , S−1]. Thus,
starting from Eq. (14) we also conclude that
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lim
L→∞
[
H [S−L+1, . . . , S0]−H [S−L+1, . . . , S−1]
]
(19)
= lim
L→∞
H [S0|S−L+1, . . . , S−1] (20)
= H [S0|
←
S ] (21)
=
→
hµ . (22)
From this we see that (i) the forward-time and reverse-
time entropy rates are equal,
←
hµ =
→
hµ, and (ii) they are
the same as the dive: v = hµ. (From here on we drop the
time arrows and denote a process’s entropy rate by hµ.)
To summarize, we have shown that the Shannon en-
tropy rate controls the average rate of increase in the
thermodynamic depth and that the dive is invariant un-
der time reversal. Recall that hµ also controls the av-
erage rate of increase of Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity
[14]. These aspects of depth are not a surprise and are in
accord with the claim that “the average complexity of a
state must be proportional to the Shannon entropy of the
set of trajectories that experiment determines can lead to
that state” [8, p. 190]. From these elementary uses of
information theoretic identities it is clear at this point
that thermodynamic depth measures nothing other than
the macroscopic randomness generated by a system.
V. SOMETHING ROTTEN IN THE STATES
The analysis of the previous section leaves us with a
puzzle: How is it that Lloyd and Pagels can state—e.g.
on each of the first six pages of Ref. [8]—that depth dis-
counts for disorder and so captures something other than
randomness?
The problem, we claim, lies in their choice of states.
In the illustrative examples in Ref. [8] macroscopic states
are selected that support the desired properties of depth.
That is, the results and interpretations do not follow from
a direct application of the given definition of thermody-
namic depth alone; biases external to the definition are
invoked.
Moreover, employing an appropriate set of macroscopic
states is crucial for obtaining a well-defined depth, since
by judiciously redefining them one can give the depth
any value from 0 on up. To see this, remember that the
depth is the conditional entropy of a sequence of states.
If there is only one state, the depth vanishes. If we make
spurious macroscopic distinctions—e.g. acting as though
one state was really n degenerate, equiprobable states—
we add a contribution to the depth that is proportional
to logn. And, we can keep doing this until the depth is
as large as we like. (Cf. Ref. [8]’s discussion leading up
to the example on page 191.)
The states of whichever dynamical system underlies
the observed process are, at least, unambiguous candi-
dates for use in the calculation of depth, but have an
unfortunate habit of being unknown, redundant, or ex-
cessively fine-grained. Lloyd and Pagels considered this
problem by implication, discussing why, in some particu-
lar cases, certain choices of state are better than others.
They explain, for instance, on page 191 of Ref. [8] how
an unfortunate choice of measurements can make even
systems in thermodynamic equilibrium quite deep. But
they neither presented a procedure for picking sets of
states nor gave general criteria for ranking possible al-
ternative selections. This lack has not been remedied by
follow-up work on thermodynamic depth, though com-
mentary at that time by Landauer [18, p. 307] raised
related concerns.
Assuming one wants to use thermodynamic depth to
measure complexity, Occam’s razor [19] advises us to
pick the simplest representation we can—in this case,
whichever selection of states gives the smallest depth;
cf. Ref. [8, p. 193]. But this can always be trivially
achieved by lumping everything into one state, as just
noted, which gives a vanishing depth. More confusingly
there are even cases, as we’ll see a bit later, where such
lumping is entirely appropriate.
Nor can the problem of state choice be reduced to that
of coarse graining the space of observables; as done in
Ref. [8, p. 194-5] and elsewhere, for example in Refs.
[20] and [21]. While this space can be readily repre-
sented by a finite alphabet, as done above—indeed, digi-
tal measuring devices so represent it without even asking
permission—the problem is that the connection between
what we measure and the underlying process is often ob-
scure to the point of total darkness. (The definitions of
“measurement” for Hamiltonian and quantum mechani-
cal systems in Ref. [8] shed no light on this point.) It is
certainly not desirable to conflate a process’s complexity
with the complexity of whatever apparatus connects the
process to the variables we happen to have seized upon
as handles.
One helpful step in developing any measure of complex-
ity is that it be calculated on simple illustrative examples
which can be thoroughly and unambiguously analyzed.
We now proceed to do this for a series of examples—all
of them based on Markov chains, if only to guarantee that
nothing especially tricky or esoteric is at issue. In fact, we
can interpret each example as a type of one-dimensional
spin-1 statistical mechanical system; cf. Ref. [22]. (We
emphasize that our results in other sections are not re-
stricted to this class of Markov processes.)
The hidden Markov models we analyze contain a set of
“internal” states, belonging to a finite alphabet X , which
are not directly observable. At each time-step, there is
some probability of moving from the current state to any
other, while “emitting” an observable symbol drawn from
another alphabet A. We denote the probability of going
from internal state i to internal state j while emitting
the measurement value s as T
(s)
ij . These models thus
generate a pair of linked stochastic processes, one over the
internal states and the other over the observable values,
and only the latter is directly detectable. Nonhidden
Markov models are those where these two processes are
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one and the same: where A = X and T
(s)
ij = 0 unless
s = j.
BA
C
1/3
1/31/3 1/3
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/3
FIG. 1. A simple Markov chain that generates random
sequences—BBAC . . .—with finite dive (v = log
2
3) and so
infinite total depth (DL →L→∞ ∞).
Consider first a nonhidden system of three states
X = A = {A,B,C}, each of which can go to any
other, including itself, with equal probability; see Fig. 1.
Here, according to the prescription of Lloyd and Pagels,
DL = L log2 3, the total depth is infinite, and the dive
is exactly equal to the entropy rate of the observable
sequences, i.e. v = hAµ = log2 3 bits per step. The se-
quences generated are completely random, but neither
the depth nor dive vanish.
Next, we hide the internal states X from observation,
but at each time step a measuring instrument emits one
of two observable symbols s ∈ A = {0, 1}, as in Fig.
2. In this way we recover a simple version of the micro-
macroscopic distinction of Ref. [8]. The transition matri-
ces T
(s)
ij are, in this case,
T (0) =
[
1/2 0 0
0 1/2 0
0 0 1/2
]
(23)
and
T (1) =
[
0 1/2 0
0 0 1/2
1/2 0 0
]
. (24)
That is, each state either loops back on itself, emitting
s = 0, or goes to the next state in the chain, emitting
s = 1, with equal probability. The dive, i.e. the entropy
rate hAµ of the observables, is v = 1 bit per step. The
entropy rate hXµ of the internal states is also 1 bit per
step, since, given the current state, there are two possible,
equiprobable successors. Moreover, while the system is a
quite adequate source of random sequences, macroscopic
states s ∈ A, as well as the three hidden states, continue
to deepen at the rate of 1 bit per step.
BA
C
0 0.5
0 0.5
0 0.5
1 0.51 0.5
1 0.5
FIG. 2. A simple hidden Markov model that generates
strings with finite dive (v = hAµ = 1 bit per step) and infinite
long-run depth. The edge notation s|p denotes that a transi-
tion is to be taken with probability p, emitting measurement
value s.
Note that by inserting additional states betweenA and
B, that are equally likely to either loop back to them-
selves on s = 0 or go to the next state in the chain on
s = 1, it is easy to go from Fig. 2 to “Rube Goldberg” au-
tomata. These are representations with elaborated sets of
states with exactly the same observable process and prop-
erties (i.e. with the same Pr(. . . , s−1, s0, s1, . . .), where
st ∈ {0, 1}), but with increasing internal-state structure.
Thus, there are inherent ambiguities in using inappropri-
ately baroque sets of states when describing the struc-
tural properties of a process; ambiguities that must be
addressed somehow.
a 0.5
a 0.5
a 0.5
a 0.5
b 0.5
a 0.5
B
C
A
FIG. 3. A hidden Markov model of the logistic map sym-
bolic dynamics observed with a nongenerating partition.
Finally, consider the symbolic dynamics of the logistic
map of the unit interval: xt+1 = f(xt) = 4xt(1 − xt).
Here the microscopic state space is continuous: xt ∈
X = [0, 1], but we observe xt with a binary-valued in-
strument A = {“a” ∼ [0, xˆ), “b” ∼ [xˆ, 1]}, where xˆ is the
largest pre-image of 1/2. When xt ∈ [0, xˆ) the instrument
emits s = a and when xt ∈ [xˆ, 1] it emits s = b. This
“nongenerating” partition of X leads to the three hidden
states that are coarse-grainings of X : A ∼ [0, 1 − xˆ),
B ∼ [1 − xˆ, xˆ), and C ∼ [xˆ, 1]. Recalling that we can
calculate the invariant distribution Pr(x), the resulting
stochastic finite-state model of the symbolic dynamics
process is shown in Fig. 3. (See Refs. [17] and [23] for
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more discussion of this example.)
The transition matrices for this process are
T (b) =
[
0 0 0
0 0 1/2
0 0 0
]
(25)
and
T (a) =
[
1/2 1/2 0
0 1/2 0
1/2 1/2 0
]
. (26)
The entropy rate hXµ , measured over the states, is 1 bit
per step, but the dive v = hAµ (of the observables) is
lower: v ≈ 0.811 bits per step. The states, in other
words, are actually worse—less predictable, deeper, and
more demanding of memory (in a sense made precise
presently)—than the surface phenomena (sequences over
A) they are supposed to explain. (Refs. [17] and [24] dis-
cuss this curious phenomenon. A detailed mathematical
analysis is found in Ref. [23].)
This example illustrates the measurement dependency
of both randomness and complexity. In contrast with
the binary instrument just used, if the logistic map is
observed with a generating partition, for which infinite
a-b sequences are in correspondence with the microscopic
states xt ∈ [0, 1], there is only a single internal state.
In this case, the internal state entropy rate hXµ is zero
and the entropy rate of the observed symbol sequences
is hAµ = 1 bit per symbol. It turns out that this is the
correct description of the logistic map dynamics; see Ref.
[25] for an elementary exposition.
Readers will have already noticed, and been troubled
by, the fact that all our examples are simple sources
of random strings, but have steep dives. According to
the definition, they are deep, complex processes, despite
Lloyd and Pagels’s explicit statement that depth is small
or vanishes for random processes.
VI. CAUSAL STATES AND ǫ-MACHINES
On the one hand, what these examples make clear is
that we generally won’t find macroscopic states appropri-
ate to measuring a process’s statistical complexity just by
translating observables (via coarse-graining) into a finite
alphabet. On the other hand, especially in experimen-
tal work, we often have no source of information other
than the sequence of finite-precision discrete-valued ob-
servables. There is a fundamental difficulty here. More-
over, part of the attraction of thermodynamic depth,
compared to (say) Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity [9,10]
and logical depth [26], was its claimed calculability from
empirical data.
There is at least one release from these ambiguities: it
is found in the use of causal states, as they are conceived
of by computational mechanics—an extension of statis-
tical mechanics that explicitly accounts for a process’s
structure [16,22]. From the viewpoint of an observer, the
idea is that two trajectories leave one in the same causal
state if they leave one equally knowledgeable as to the
future. More formally, a causal state S is an equivalence
class over histories
←
s of observed states, such that all the
sequences in the causal state give the same conditional
distribution for the semi-infinite future
→
s :
ǫ(
←
s ) = {
←
s
′
| ∀
→
s Pr(
→
s |
←
s
′
) = Pr(
→
s |
←
s )} . (27)
The causal-state equivalence classes form a partition of
the set
←
S of all histories; see Fig. 4. Thus defined, ǫ(
←
s ) is
a function from a history
←
s to a set of histories, which are
the causal states Si, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .. We denote the set
{Si} of all causal states by S. It is convenient sometimes
to have a function taking one from a history
←
s to the
label i of its equivalence class and, in a slight abuse of
notation, we will also call this ǫ(
←
s ).
1S
4S
3S 5
S
2S
6S
S
←
FIG. 4. A schematic representation of partitioning the set
←
S of all histories into causal states Si. Within each causal
state all the individual histories
←
s have the same conditional
distribution Pr(
→
S |
←
s ) for future observables. Note that the
Si need not form compact sets; we have simply drawn them
that way here for clarity.
Since we need some choice of state if we are to ap-
ply depth at all, and if we are not to consign it to the
growing collection of subjective complexity measures (see
Ref. [4]), we might as well select a process’s causal states.
What is notable, though, is that, while causal states were
not designed with this end in mind, they minimize dive.
The representation of a process consisting of the causal
states and their transitions is known as an ǫ-machine. In
the simplest setting, an ǫ-machine is a Markov chain over
a finite number of causal states and so can be compactly
described by a labeled transition matrix T
(s)
ij , notation-
ally similar to that for the examples above. This matrix
can be calculated (analytically or empirically) from the
distribution of observed sequences, a procedure called ǫ-
machine reconstruction.
An ǫ-machine lets us calculate the probability of differ-
ent sequences of observables. It also leads to an invariant
probability distribution Pr(S) over the causal states. The
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resulting complexity measure for a process is the statisti-
cal complexity Cµ which is defined simply as the Shannon
entropy of that distribution [16]: Cµ = H [S]. Cµ mea-
sures the average amount of historical information stored
in the current state. Our results in section VII are not,
however, restricted to cases where the ǫ-machine is finite
Markovian, merely to ones where there is a probability
measure over the causal states.
A process’s thermodynamic depth, and thus its dive,
are defined with reference to its macroscopic states, what-
ever we take those to be. Due to the ambiguities that
follow from a prosaic interpretation of depth’s definition
we propose to redefine depth, and by implication the
dive, solely in terms of a process’s causal states. The
first result of taking the “macroscopic” states to be the
causal states is that the dive is the entropy rate of the ǫ-
machine’s internal-state process: v ≡ hXµ , where X = S.
The second result is that by Eq. (18) v ≤ Cµ. In fact,
v < Cµ, if there is any mutual information in the ob-
served sequences
↔
S , by Eq. (106) in Ref. [22].
Causal state equivalence-classing guarantees that the
ǫ-machine is as small as it can be and still be an ac-
curate predictor of future observed sequences; see sub-
section VII B below. This makes ǫ-machines for both
highly ordered and highly random sequences very sim-
ple: a high degree of randomness means that many dis-
tinct sequences of observables leave one equally uncertain
about the future and, consequently, those sequences all
leave the system in the same causal state. In this way one
derives the desired “boundary conditions” for statistical
complexity measures—low for both simple and for ran-
dom processes—from the underlying principle of optimal
prediction; that is, from Eq. (27).
A|1/3 B|1/3
C|1/3
FIG. 5. The ǫ-machine for the unhidden Markov model of
Fig. 1. The internal entropy rate hXµ and the statistical com-
plexity Cµ vanish since there is a single causal state.
These properties of causal states suffice to rescue the
complexity analysis of the examples from the confusions
of the last section. The first (Fig. 1) corresponds to an
ǫ-machine with a single causal state S0 that returns to
itself on three separate, equally probable symbols A =
{A,B,C}. (See Fig. 5.) The entropy rate hAµ of the
observed sequences is (as always) preserved under the
change of representation to causal states, but the entropy
rate hSµ of the causal state process itself, i.e. the now-
redefined dive v, is, like the statistical complexity, zero.
A similar fate awaits our second example (Fig. 2). Un-
der causal state equivalence-classing, the three alleged
states collapse into one, yielding an ideal coin-tossing
machine with a single state and two transitions. (See
Fig. 6.) Here again the statistical complexity and the
new dive vanish. Defining depth in terms of a process’s
causal states leads us, in both examples, to recover the
intuitively correct notion that these sources of purely ran-
dom sequences are neither structurally complex nor store
much information about their history.
1|1/2 0|1/2
FIG. 6. The ǫ-machine for the hidden Markov model of Fig.
2. The internal entropy rate hXµ and the statistical complexity
Cµ again vanish since there is a single causal state.
In our final example (Fig. 3), the future conditional
distribution of observables depends only on how long it
has been since the last “b”, leading to a countable infinity
of causal states. (See Fig. 7.) It turns out that the new
dive and the statistical complexity can be analytically
calculated; one finds v ≈ 0.677867 bits per measurement
and Cµ ≈ 2.71147 bits of historical memory are stored
by the process [17,23]. It is a more complex process than
the other two examples.
a|5/8a|3/4 a|2/3
b|1/3 b|3/8
a|1
b|1/4
a|1/2
b|1/2b|2/5
a|3/5
FIG. 7. The ǫ-machine for the hidden Markov model of Fig.
3 has a countable infinity of causal states. The internal en-
tropy rate hXµ and statistical complexity Cµ are both positive,
indicating that this is an intrinsically more complex process
than the other two examples.
One of the desired properties of thermodynamic depth
was that it accounted for the history of the “assembly
process” [8, p. 187–9 and passim]. We should emphasize
that by definition causal states account for a form of his-
torical memory, though in an importantly different way.
Causal states measure the amount of historical informa-
tion stored in a system.
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VII. OPTIMAL SHALLOWNESS OF ǫ-MACHINES
Working with the ǫ-machine representation forces one
to distinguish between
1. sequences over coarse-grained observables A,
2. sequences over causal states S,
3. sequences over transitions, the labeled edges
{(i, j, s) : T
(s)
ij > 0} .
There is a many-to-one relation between edge sequences
and causal-state sequences and also between edge se-
quences and observable sequences. But, as we saw when
we defined the causal states as equivalence classes, Eq.
(27), there is a function that takes a history to a causal
state: namely, ǫ :
←
S 7→ S. One consequence is that one
can specify all of the relevant historical information by
noting which of the causal states the process is in, rather
than recounting a possibly infinite amount of information
from the history
←
S that led to the current state. That is,
causal states provide a compression of a process’s history.
These distinctions and the historical compression are
good motivations for deciding which type of state to use
for a process. But these alone are not enough, so let’s
consider alternatives to causal states, namely another set
R of states, call them R-states, that are determinable
from observed sequences and that, like causal states, par-
tition
←
S ; see Fig. 8. We assume that these rivals to the ǫ-
machine are, like the ǫ-machine itself, restricted to using
only the past history of observables in their predictions,
without any other hints.
1R 3R
2R
1S
4S
3S 5
S
2S 6S
S
← 4R
FIG. 8. An alternative set {Ri} of states that partition
←
S overlaid on the causal states. (The Ri are delineated by
dashed lines.) The collection of all such alternative partitions
form Occam’s “pool”. Note again that the Ri need not be
compact.
As one ranges over alternative choices of state—
swimming around in Occam’s “pool” of possible
partitions—we will show that the ǫ-machine has a three-
fold optimality: (i) no set of R-states is more informa-
tive about future observables than the causal states; of
those choices of states that are as predictive as the causal
states, none has (ii) a smaller statistical complexity nor
(iii) a smaller entropy rate over the internal states. We
conclude that none of the alternatives, if used to calcu-
late the depth, would give us a shallower dive than the
causal states. We’ll prove these in order.
A. Nothing Forecasts Better than an ǫ-Machine
Call the sequence of observables up to the present time
←
S , the random variable that is the next observable S,
and the random variable that is the whole sequence of
future observables
→
S . Recall that the function ǫ :
←
S
7→ S returns the causal state the ǫ-machine is in after
observing
←
S and define the function η :
←
S 7→R similarly
for the R-states. We measure the forecasting ability of a
set of states by H [
→
S |R],2 the uncertainty that remains
in the future observables once we know the current state.
That is, the better the set of states is at forecasting—the
more prescient it is—the smaller this uncertainty. From
Eq. (27) it follows that
Pr(
→
S |ǫ(
←
S )) = Pr(
→
S |
←
S ) , (28)
and so
H [
→
S |ǫ(
←
S )] = H [
→
S |
←
S ] . (29)
Since, for any random variables X and Y and function
f ,
H [Y |f(X)] ≥ H [Y |X ] , (30)
it follows that
H [
→
S |η(
←
S )] ≥ H [
→
S |
←
S ] (31)
= H [
→
S |ǫ(
←
S )] (32)
and so
H [
→
S |R] ≥ H [
→
S |S] . (33)
Thus, no alternative setR of states sees the future better
than the causal states.
In what follows, we will put a hat over the name of
any rival set of states that is as predictive as the causal
states, i.e. we refer to states in Rˆ if and only if H [
→
S
|Rˆ] = H [
→
S |S].
2This quantity can be infinite. In this case, we should use
limL→∞ L
−1H [
→
S
L
|R], but for notational convenience this
will be understood in the following. The limit exists for all
stationary processes [14].
8
B. Nothing as Prescient as an ǫ-Machine is Simpler
Suppose we have a set Rˆ of states for whichH [
→
S |Rˆ] =
H [
→
S |S]. Then, because the causal states are equivalence
classes with respect to future conditional probabilities,
the Rˆ-states must be refinements of these classes. That
is, rather than the situation depicted in Fig. 8, we have
the Rˆ-partitioning shown in Fig. 9. Otherwise at least
one Rˆi, considered as a set, would have to include histo-
ries that belonged to at least two distinct causal states.
Such mixing of causal states can only increase the uncer-
tainty about the future sequence
→
S of observables. That
is, for every Rˆi there is a Sj such that Rˆi ⊆ Sj and so
every causal state is a union of Rˆ-states.
3R
∧
4R
∧
5R
∧
6R
∧
7R
∧
8R
∧
1R
∧
9R
∧
10R
∧
2R
∧
1S
4S
3S
5S
2S
6S
S
←
11R
∧
FIG. 9. Any alternative partition that is as prescient as
the causal states must be a refinement of the causal-state
partition. That is, each Rˆi must be a (possibly improper)
subset of some Sj . Otherwise, at least one Rˆi would have to
contain parts of at least two causal states. And so using this
Rˆi to predict the future observables leads to more uncertainty
about
→
S than using the causal states.
The result is that the causal state is a function of the
Rˆ-state: S = g(Rˆ). Thus,
H [S] = H [g(Rˆ)] ≤ H [Rˆ] . (34)
But H [S] is Cµ, the statistical complexity of the ǫ-
machine, whereas H [Rˆ] is the statistical complexity of
the η-machine—the set of Rˆ-states and their transitions.
Thus, of the optimally predictive alternative representa-
tions the ǫ-machine is the smallest, as measured by Cµ.
An argument exactly parallel to the one in the preced-
ing subsection shows, when applied to the equally pre-
scient alternatives, that
H [
→
S |Rˆ] = H [
→
S |S]⇒ H [
→
S
L
|Rˆ] = H [
→
S
L
|S] , (35)
for L = 1, 2, . . .. (The opposite implication is not true,
however.) Thus, the causal states are also at least as
informative about the next (single) observable S as any
rival and, for that matter, about any finite subsequence
→
S
L
of the future. However, in the general case of the
previous paragraphs it is necessary to consider the whole
semi-infinite future because, potentially, coarser parti-
tions can match these finite-L predictive powers. If, for
instance, two histories have the same distribution for S,
but different distributions over the whole future, they
belong to different causal states. An Rˆ-state that com-
bined those two causal states, however, would enjoy the
same ability to predict S and its η-machine would have
a smaller statistical complexity.
C. Nothing as Prescient as an ǫ-Machine Has a
Smaller Dive
We will now show that the ǫ-machine’s dive (v = hSµ )
is at least as small as that of any equally prescient alter-
native. This also turns on the fact that such Rˆ-states are
refinements of the causal states. The ǫ-machine is deter-
ministic in the sense of automata theory [22]; that is, the
present state S and the next observable S together fix
the next state S ′, and so H [S ′|S,S] = 0. Thus, we have
H [S|S] = H [S ′, S|S] . (36)
The Rˆ-machine, however, is not necessarily determinis-
tic in this sense, but all entropies are non-negative, so
H [Rˆ′|S, Rˆ] ≥ 0. Since we are considering alternatives
with the same predictive power as the ǫ-machine, i.e. al-
ternatives for which H [
→
S |S] = H [
→
S |Rˆ], then we have
H [S|S] = H [S|Rˆ]. On the one hand,
H [Rˆ′, S|Rˆ] = H [S|Rˆ] +H [Rˆ′|S, Rˆ] (37)
≥ H [S|Rˆ] (38)
= H [S|S] (39)
= H [S ′, S|S] (40)
= H [S ′|S] +H [S|S ′,S] . (41)
On the other hand,
H [Rˆ′, S|Rˆ] = H [Rˆ′|Rˆ] +H [S|Rˆ′, Rˆ] , (42)
as well, so
H [Rˆ′|Rˆ] +H [S|Rˆ′, Rˆ] ≥ H [S ′|S] +H [S|S ′,S] , (43)
or
H [Rˆ′|Rˆ]−H [S ′|S] ≥ H [S|S ′,S]−H [S|Rˆ′, Rˆ] . (44)
Since a causal state is a function of an Rˆ-state, the tran-
sition pair (S ′,S) is a function of the transition pair
(Rˆ′, Rˆ), implying that H [S|S ′,S] ≥ H [S|Rˆ′, Rˆ]. Thus,
the RHS of Eq. (44) is non-negative and this implies that
H [Rˆ′|Rˆ] ≥ H [S ′|S] , (45)
which is the desired result; namely, vRˆ ≥ vS . That is,
nothing which predicts as well as the ǫ-machine has a
smaller dive than the ǫ-machine does.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
If one prefers processes over static descriptions and
dislikes pretending every natural thing is a digital com-
puter, thermodynamic depth seemed to be an attractive
complexity measure: “one of the remarkably few thrusts
in this area which is not conspicuously vacuous,” in the
words of Landauer [18]. Since total depth most likely
shares the incalculability, though not the formal uncom-
putability, of Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity and logi-
cal depth, it is not, at face value, physically significant.
Dive, the rate at which depth increases, is both calcula-
ble and significant. We showed dive is the reverse-time
Shannon entropy rate of the stochastic process over the
macroscopic states one takes the system to be in. With
nothing else said or added, however, depth typically mea-
sures historical randomness; as do Kolmogorov-Chaitin
complexity and the Shannon entropy rate.
Unfortunately, Ref. [8], which introduced depth, gave
no clue as to how macroscopic states are to be selected;
though it strongly suggested this is simply a matter of
coarse-graining the space of microscopic states; cf. [8,
pp. 194–5]. As we’ve shown, this approach produces
manifestly ambiguous results.
By way of fixing depth, we highlighted the key role of
the choice of macroscopic states. The causal states of
computational mechanics do not suffer from the defects
and ill-definedness that led to trouble with other sorts
of states. The procedure that identifies them, ǫ-machine
reconstruction, also gives us a way to calculate depth and
dive. We removed depth’s ambiguities and recovered its
claimed features by redefining it in terms of the causal
states.
We then gave our main results, showing that no al-
ternative set of states to the causal states contains more
information about the future of observables. Moreover,
unless an alternative throws some of that information
away it cannot have a smaller statistical complexity or a
lower dive. Thus, ǫ-machines are optimally shallow.
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